{"author":{"id":"121544264","location":"","name":"Filippo Belloc","seoDescription":"","slug":"filippo-belloc"},"authorSources":[{"id":"121544265","lede":"\"We analyse how countries' innovation outcomes are affected by national legislations of worker participation to corporate governance. We develop a model of employee representation laws (ERL) and innovation in the presence of incomplete labour contracts and predict heterogeneous ERL effects across different systems of dismissal regulation. We then perform a panel regression analysis, exploiting 2-digit panel data for 21 manufacturing sectors of USA, UK, India, France and Germany, over the 1977-2005 period. We find that ERL effects on aggregate innovation output are positive, statistically significant and higher in magnitude where national labour laws impose significant firing costs to the firm with respect to institutional settings in which firing costs are low or absent. These results are robust to possible technology selection dynamics, endogeneity and institutional changes in the legal system of patent protection. We also estimate ERL effects on innovation conditional on firing costs at an industry level and show that the impact of ERL is relatively larger in those sectors where the human capital contribution to production is higher. Our results have relevant implications for the optimal design of employee representation legislations.\"","link":"https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Employee-Representation-Legislations-and-Innovation-Belloc/0e61f36649a69d1b9a2cba2b1f06fd832b90f241","slug":"employee-representation-legislations-and-innovation","kind":"Academic Paper","title":"Employee Representation Legislations and Innovation","year":null,"researchers":[{"id":"121544264","location":"","name":"Filippo Belloc","seoDescription":"","slug":"filippo-belloc"}]}],"sourceIds":["121544265"],"authorSourcesInsights":[{"id":"121544269","lede":"Study data spanned manufacturing sectors of the USA, UK, France, and Germany from 1977 - 2005. ","slug":"stronger-employee-representation-laws-are-positively-associated-with-aggregate-in","title":"Stronger employee representation laws are positively associated with aggregate innovation.","showTitleAsQuote":false,"epistemicStatus":"econometric","reports":[{"id":"69359365","title":"Codetermination","slug":"codetermination"}],"tags":[{"slug":"innovation","name":"Innovation","id":"69608404","lede":"","ledeExcerpt":"","featured":true},{"slug":"growth","name":"Growth","id":"23932836","lede":"

We define growth as the expansion of wealth in society; growth is about generating a "a bigger pie".

\n\n

Amidst debates over the merits of continued growth, we begin with the idea that all else equal, a society with growth, with more wealth, is preferable to one with less. Without growth, society becomes a zero-sum distributional game: anyone's gain is another's loss. Growth (all else equal) enables shared prosperity.

\n\n

But there is broad agreement that current measures of growth, such as GDP, are inadequate to the task of providing a suitable proxy to guide further growth. Whether devising improved measures that account for missing elements such as sustainability, equity, leisure time, or digital value, or constructing altogether new proxies (OECD's Better Life Index, for example), the conversation about how best to measure, and thus drive, equitable, regenerative, socially desirable growth is a rich field of debate.

\n","ledeExcerpt":"We define growth as the expansion of wealth in society; growth is about generating a \"a bigger pie\".\n\nAmidst debates over the merits of continued growth, we begin with the idea that *all else equal*, a society with growth, with more wealth, is preferable to one with less. Without growth, society becomes a zero-sum distributional game: anyone's gain is another's loss. Growth (all else equal) enables shared prosperity.\n\nBut there is broad agreement that current measures of growth, such as GDP, are inadequate to the task of providing a suitable proxy to guide further growth. Whether devising revised measures, such as Tyler Cowen's notion of wealth plus\" (GDP, plus measures of leisure time, household production, and environmental considerations), or constructing altogether new proxies (OECD's 'Better Life Index), the conversation about how best to measure, and thus drive, equitable, regenerative, socially desirable growth is a rich field of debate.","featured":true},{"slug":"economic-democracy","name":"Economic Democracy","id":"69609474","lede":"

Since Alexis de Tocqueville's analysis of agrarian America in the 1800's, the ideals of liberty and equality have often been seen as in conflict.

\n\n

But as Robert Dahl writes: "...the agrarian economy and society on which it was based underwent a revolutionary transformation into a new system of commercial and industrial capitalism that automatically generated vast inequalities of wealth, income, status, and power. These inequalities were in turn a result of liberty of a certain kind–liberty to accumulate unlimited economic resources and to organize economic activity into hierarchically governed enterprises."

\n\n

Or, as David Schweickart comments: "Contemporary capitalism celebrates democracy, yet denies us our democratic rights at precisely the point where they might be utilized most immediately and concretely: at the place where we spend most of the active and alert hours of our adult lives."

\n\n

Economic democracy, broadly, is the idea that decision-making power should not be the exclusive right of managers and shareholders, but held in equal by all stakeholders affected by those decisions. In practice, both Dahl & Schweickart see "workplace democracy" - from codetermination to worker-owned cooperatives - as one concrete manifestation of economic democracy.

\n","ledeExcerpt":"Economic democracy, broadly, is the idea that decision-making power should not be the exclusive right of managers and shareholders, but held in equal by all stakeholders affected by those decisions. In practice, both Dahl & Schweickart see \"workplace democracy\" - from codetermination to worker-owned cooperatives - as one concrete manifestation of economic democracy.","featured":null}],"sources":[{"id":"121544265","lede":"\"We analyse how countries' innovation outcomes are affected by national legislations of worker participation to corporate governance. We develop a model of employee representation laws (ERL) and innovation in the presence of incomplete labour contracts and predict heterogeneous ERL effects across different systems of dismissal regulation. We then perform a panel regression analysis, exploiting 2-digit panel data for 21 manufacturing sectors of USA, UK, India, France and Germany, over the 1977-2005 period. We find that ERL effects on aggregate innovation output are positive, statistically significant and higher in magnitude where national labour laws impose significant firing costs to the firm with respect to institutional settings in which firing costs are low or absent. These results are robust to possible technology selection dynamics, endogeneity and institutional changes in the legal system of patent protection. We also estimate ERL effects on innovation conditional on firing costs at an industry level and show that the impact of ERL is relatively larger in those sectors where the human capital contribution to production is higher. Our results have relevant implications for the optimal design of employee representation legislations.\"","link":"https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Employee-Representation-Legislations-and-Innovation-Belloc/0e61f36649a69d1b9a2cba2b1f06fd832b90f241","slug":"employee-representation-legislations-and-innovation","kind":"Academic Paper","title":"Employee Representation Legislations and Innovation","year":null,"researchers":[{"id":"121544264","location":"","name":"Filippo Belloc","seoDescription":"","slug":"filippo-belloc"}]}]}]}